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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system nearly
sixty years ago, there has been controversy about the adequacy of benefit payments. l
Opinions have ranged from the view that UI does little more than subsidize leisure to the
position that benefit levels grossly undercompensate for the physical and psychic hardships
caused by unemployment.
TheUI system was c:;signed to be completely separate from relief programs, with
eligibility determined by labor force attachment and benefit levels based on prior earnings
experience. The benefit objectives of UI were recently set forth by the Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 8) in a statement of purpose for the UI system.
The most important objective of the U.S. system of unemployment insurance is
the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right to
involuntarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a prior
attachment to the labor force. This support should help meet the necessary
expenses of these workers as they search for employment that takes advantage
of their skills and experience.
In this statement the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation makes clear
that the primary goal of UI is providing compensation for wage loss experienced as a resul t
of involuntary unemployment. When making recommendations concerning benefit adequacy
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 20). proposed:
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of lost earnings
over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to two-thirds
of the state's average weekly wages.
ISee Becker (1960) for an early history of public sentiment on several aspects of VI, and
Curtin and Ponza (1980) for a summary of some more recent attitudes.
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The Council's aim was to ensure one-half wage replacement/or a large number of
beneficiaries.
The most recent major effort to investigate the adequacy of UI was done in the 1970s
by Paul Burgess and Jerry Kingston (1978a, 1918b) who conducted the Arizona Benefit
Adequacy Study under the sponsorship of the U.S~ Department of Labor. The methodology
used by Burgess and Kingston closely paralleled that ofearlier researchers. 2 The typical
approach is to question a sampl~ of VI recipients about their expenditures on a class of goods
and services deemed "necessary" and compare the level ofUI benefits to the level of these
expenses.
Surveys of the type done hy Burgess and Kingston, while extremely valuable, have
proven to be quite expensive.3 The high cost of gathering data has resulted in small sample
sizes, but a more fundamental problem exists with the traditional approach. These studies
presume that the analyst may determine which categories of expenditure are "necessary" or
which items a 'household may least do without.
The problems of sample size'and expenditure category selection, are both addressed in
the present study by using a readily available large data set, the Current Population Survey
(CPS) Annual Demographic File, ilnda.h agnostic approach to measuring unemployment
compensation based on" the economic theory of consumer-worker behavior. The methodology
relies on a natural theoretical approach to estimating' the upper limit on unemployment
com~nsation--solve for the lump sum payment, which~ when given to an unemployed
individual, makes her indifferent between her current lot and her pre-unemployment one.
2Haber and Murray (1966) provide a summary of state studies done in the 1950s which
used the same basic methodology later used by Blaustein and Mackin (1977) and Burgess and
Kingston (1978a, 1978b).
3 Becker (1961, p.23) noted that for the benefit adequacy studies done in the 1950s "[t]he
time spent per interview averaged about three hours, with a range from one to fourteen
hours, exclusive of the time spent in re-interviews of the more diffic~lt cases. "
- 2 -
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UI is not intended to fully compensate the loss an individual experiences as a result of
unem.ployed, a financial inducement should remain for returning to work. Knowing
upper limit on the level of benefits is important for setting practical program guidelines.
In the next section a discussion of the accepted norms.of benefit adequacy provides
framework for a review of the literature on assessing benefit adequacy. A simple
........"V'A ...'~& ......_ approach to estimating the upper.limit on unemployment compensation is given in
.... aor>'nn.w-a 3 where explicit formulae for performing the computations are also given. In Section
the econometric methods to be u~ed and the samples drawn from the .1992 CPS Annual
J.J"'lI.V~"~'V"'"'''' File are discussed; basic labor supply results are also presented. Simulation
for a variety of household types, preference structures, and representative states are
in Section 6. The final section 'presents .~ summary of the new research findings,
considers program guidelines in light of the evidence presented.
STANDARDS OF BENEFIT ADEQUACY
In his classic monograph The Adequacy of the Benefit Amount in Unemployment
Insurance, Father Joseph M. Becker (1961, p. 11) noted that; "A satisfactory norm of
adequacy must have two elements--one positive, by which it can explain why benefits are as
large as they are, and one negative, by which it can explain why they are no larger. II
Senator Paul Douglas (1932, p. 885) had earlier stated these principles in more substantive
form. He suggested that "[t]here is a minimum of life which must be defended by the
system of benefits," and that "[t]he amounts which the unemployed receive in benefits should
always be appreciably less than what they would earn if employed [so that] ... the temptation
to shun work in order to draw the benefit will be greatly reduced" (Douglas 1932, p. 4).
Douglas proposed that a balancing of these objectives might be achieved if unemployment
benefits were to replace approximately. one-half of lost wages for individuals who are unem-
ployed and have demonstrated a significant attachment to the labor force.
- 3 ""
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While federal law has never specified the exact rate at which lost wages must be
replaced under DI, every president since Eisenhower has reaffi,rmed the position that
"payments to the great majority of the beneficiaries should equal at least half of regular
earnings" (Becker 1980, p. 11). The Nixon administration specified that great majority
should mean four-fifths of the nation's workforce, (Becker 1980, p. 11). This criterion of
benefit adequacy has come to be known as on.e-halffor four-fifths.
2.1 The Wage Replacement Ratio: An Aggregate Criterion
Whi,le most states have benefit formula intended to replace approximately one-half of
lost wages, the maximum on payments guarantees that many high wage workers will receive
less than half their average lost earnings, and the minimum means that some low wage
workers may receive more than half their average earnings. The data in Table 1 summarize
the national historical experience on benefit adequacy using a very aggregate measure--the
average wage replacement ratio (WRR). The national average WRR is defined by:
n
E WBA j / n
i= 1
WRR '= -------------------
m
E WEj / m
j=l
where, WBA j = the weekly benefit amount received by the ith ur
recipient,
n = the number of VI recipients,
WEj = the weekly earnings of the jth covered worker, and
m = the number of workers covered by UI.
- 4 -
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In the first few years of UI, earnings of covered workers were unusually low, and the
was quite high. This is why there was little controversy ~bout the adequacy of the
benefit amount until earnings rose rapidly after World War II. Figure 1 shows the
'-J""",.U.IIAlib trend of the WRR through the early 1950s. Since that time the WRR has ranged
thirty-two and thirty-seven percent, being approximately thirty-six percent in recent
Figure 1 which also shows a general upward trend in the WRR since about 1950.
Controlling for the changing occupational mix of VI claimants, Hight (1980) arrived at lower
bound estimates of 0.10 to 0.29 percent increase in the WRR per year over the period
1950-1977;. and concluded that there has been some real gains in adequacy over the period.
Table 2 lists the WRR for each state in 1994. While the national WRR was 36.05 percent in
1994, WRRs across the states ranged from a low of 26.8 percent in California to a high of
53.7 percent in Hawaii. A total of 18 states had WRRs greater than 40 percent in 1994.
Presumably the WRR is used as a rough gauge of benefit adequacy because the data
needed to compute it is readily available. It is the main measure of benefit adequacy
regularly reported by the U.S. Department of Labor.4 However, the WRR as computed by
the formula given above is a bit misleading. The denominator in the WRR considers wages
for the entire population of covered workers, while the numerator considers only payments to
4 It is reported by the U.S. Department of Labor quarterly in VI Data Summary and
annually in updates to VI Fin.anc.ial Data, ET Handbook No. 394.
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beneficiaries. Properly, we should examine benefit payments relative to lost earnings of
beneficiaries.
Wayne Vroman (1980) who provided a comprehensive review of possible wage
replacement rate computations called the series presented in Figure 1 and Tables 1 and· 2 a
gross narrow wage replacement' ratio which is the one used historically. He also cited
criticism that the measure underestimates the "true" replacement ratio because "unemployed
workers receive lower wages than the average worker covered ~y the program. liS Using
unpublished micro data on the actual pre-unemployment earnings of beneficiaries from
Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin for various periods
during the 1980s, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 138)
estimated that the gross narrow computation understates the true wage replacement rates by
25 to 30 percentage points.
The dramatic difference in wage replacement ratio estimates computed· by the rather
misleading gross. narrow WRR formula and those produced using micro data on actual
benefits and prior earnings convinced the Unemployment Compensation Advisory Council
(1995, p. 21) to recommend that:
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate arid report the actual replacement rate
for individuals who receive Unemployment Insurance. This replacement rate should
S Vroman (1980, p. 170).
- 6 -
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be calculated by dividing theweekly benefits paid to indiviquals by the average
weekly earnings paid to those individuals prior to unemployment.
Vroman (1980, p. 170-72) reported that some researchers using micro data have
at very high net WRR figures. Feldstein (1974), who was concerned with the
adverse incentive effects of UI, estimated that the net wage repla~em.ent ratio is often more
than seventy percent. Munbe and Garfinkel (1974) fpundreplacement rates in· Ohio in
1971-1972 to range from .38 to .89 for several distincttypes of family units. Corson et al.
(1977), determined the average ratio of benefits to ,lost wages in. 1977 to be: .66.
However, wh6n broader measures of macro wage· replacement which consider
uncovered workers and non-compensated weeks are computed, replacement rates are much
lower. For example Gramlich (1974), found that during the 1970-1971 recession for families
headed by men, UI replaced only six to eight percent of lost earnings, and fourteen to
eighteen percent for families headed by women. While the gross narrow WRR for 1971 was
0.363, Edgell and Wandner (1974) estimated the macro replacement rate for UI in the United
States economy to be as low as 20 percent.
The wage replacement ratio estimates produced in the 1970s also varied because of
differential treatment of taxes in the computations. This was a very. important issue prior to
the 1986 federal income tax changes Which placed income received as unemployment
compensation benefits in the same category for taxation as income from labor earnings.
- 7 -
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2.2 Meeting Essential Expenditures: Support for the Standard
During the-1950s the U.S. Department of Labor financed a series of Unemployment
Insurance benefit adequacy studies. The results of these studies have been summarized by
Becker (1961), Lester (1962), and Haber and Murray (1966). Becker (1980), while
discussing the principles which should underlie any proposal for a federal benefit standard,
focused on the evidence from studies in Tampa, Fla. (1956), Anderson, S.C.- (1957),
Albany, N. Y. (1957), Portland, Ore. (1958), and St. Louis, Mo. (1958). These five similar
studies were based on retrospective data on the income and expenditures of respondents
during the period just prior to the survey date. Expenditures were divided into deferrable -
-and non-deferrable categories-. Spending on food, clothing, medical care, and housing
constitu~ed the· non-deferrable group. Information was gathered on four household types.
After examining these studies Becker (1980, p. 26) concluded that "[n]one of the states came
close to the proposed goal of paying 80 percent of the beneficiaries half or more of their
gross wage, ... [and] [i]t is one of the weaknesses of the system that claimants without
dependents' are treated much better than claimants with dependents." He suggested that
benefit adequacy could be generally improved if benefit maximums were raised and programs
for dependents allowances were expanded.
To give some examples from the 1950s studies, Table 3 presents a summary of the
experience of those who fared best under the existing programs--households composed of a
single beneficiaJ:Y living alone. Becker (1961) found that benefits amounted to two-thirds or
- 8 -
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of the income of unemployed single beneficiaries, more than 50 percent of family
.... ,.".fT1P for families with one wage earner, 40 percent for families with two wage earners and
20 percent for families of secondary age earners. The 1950s studies demonstrated the
of the one-half wage norm for assessing benefit adequacy. On the average,
V""II',",££~U that were half or more of the wage were sufficient to cover non-deferrable expenses
all claimant household types (Becker 1980, p. 13).
The deferrable/non-deferrable distinction used in the 1950s studies was expanded by
LJlJ.~'U~,.""£11 and Mackin (1977). They added expenditures made on a regular basis to repay
VUI.~"".II~,lI'fi-, debt to expenditures for food, clothing, medical care and housing, and labeled
"recurring" expenses. Using this concept as a basis for evaluating UI benefit adequacy
they found that over two-thirds of the beneficiary households in South Carolina had adequate
income in 1977. Nonetheless, they recommended increasing benefit maximums to improve
adequacy.
Burgess and Kingston (1978a, 1978b) who conducted a detailed benefit adequacy
study in Arizona, expanded the Blaustein-Mackin definition of recurring expenses to include
expenditures on transportation, insurance, regular services, and regular support payments.
They labeled this concept "necessary and obligated" expenses, and used it to assess benefit
·adequacy for seven recipient household types. The Arizona study revealed a wide disparity
in terms of how closely benefits came to meeting the 10 necessary and obligated expenses for
different categories of beneficiaries. As in the previous studies, the two most important
- 9 -
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factors, in addition to the weekly benefit amount, in determining the economic condition of
the family during unemployment were the number of members to be supported and the
number who were contributing to the support.
Burgess and Kingston found that benefits were most adequate for beneficiaries who
had no other household members and lived with relatives--44 percent received a benefit equal
to 100 percent or more of their share of the 10 expenses. The next most adequate category
was husband and wife units in which both members worked. For 23.4 percent, the benefit
amount represented 100 percent or more of expenses. Benefits were least adequate for
beneficiaries in three or more person households in which the beneficiary was the only
earner. For only 2.3 percent did the weekly benefit amount cover 100 percent or more of
their expenses. For a majority of this category (56.1 percent), the benefit was half or less of
the expenditures.
The low maximum weekly benefit amount was the principal reason for the disparity in
the benefit-exp~nse ratios among the different categories of Arizona beneficiaries studied.
Sole wageeamers, in households with two or more members including a spouse, generally
had the highest wages and, consequently, were most often cut off by the maximum. For
those beneficiaries, the weekly benefit amount--usually the $85 maximum--was less adequate
than for any other category of beneficiary.
- 10 -
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The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 132) investigated
...k,ot"n~"'r states provided adequate UI benefits using data from the 1992 Consumer
EXloenlonure Survey. Applying the narrow definition of necessary expenses used by Blaustein
Mackin (1977), the Advisory Council found that a majority of states provide DI
compensation adequate to cover expenses for households with annual incomes in the $20,000
to $40,000 range. Very few state UI systems provided income replacement sufficient to
lTleet the broader definition of Burgess and Kingston (1978).
Grossman (1973), Hamermesh (1982) and Gruber (l994a) have directly investigated
how UI payments influence expenditure by unemployed workers. Grossman found that
unemployed persons substitute leisure for market goods in an attempt to maintain customary
consumption levels. Hamermesh concluded. that UI benefits only partly help smooth
consumption during periods of lost earnings due to unemployment, and that as much as half
of the benefits received are spent as if "individuals were fully able to borrow or had.
sufficient savings to meet transitory losses of income without any disruption in their
consumption spending. ,,6 Gruber estimated that in the absence of UI, average consumption
expenditure by unemployed persons would fall by 22%, or more than three times the decline
estimated in the presence of Ur. 7
6 Hamermesh (1982, p. 110).
7 Gruber (1994, p. 30).
- 11 -
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The consumer expenditure studies also raise a question about the importance of UI in
maintaining necessary expenditure. Gruber (1994b) investigated this question using two
sources of microeconomic consumer expenditure data. Results based on both the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CBS) "suggest that UI
has a significant effect on consumption of the unemployed. ,,8 On a finer point evidence
from the two data sets differed. The PSID results indicated UI is indispensable for
unemployed workers trying to maintain necessary expenditure, while the CBS suggested that
other forms of consumption insurance, such as savings and earn.ings of other household
members, are at least as important as UI benefits.
2.3 Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Theoretical Approach
Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) originated theoretical models ofoptimal
unemployment insurance. The models are similar in that both attempt to solve for
characteristics of the UI system which would maximize the expected lifetime utility of a
representative worker. The UI program choice parameters for this problem are the wage
replacement rate, and the potential duration of benefits. Both Baily and Flemming assume ail
infinite potential duration of benefits, and each determines that optimal replacement rates are
in the range of those provided by the states. Baily (1978, p. 393) finds that:
8 Gruber (1995, p. 31).
- 12 -
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[that if the] degree of relative risk aversion by workers [is] unity, and if workers do
not prolong their duration of unemployment very much as a result of UI payments
[Le., if the elasticity of a spell·of unemployment with respect to a change in the
benefit amount is about 0.15] then if the benefit-wage ratio is 50% it is about right.
The elasticity of unemployment with respect to the benefit amount assumed by Baily (1978)
is in line with estimates sumrr'tarized in Chapter 7.
Flemming qualifies his statements with capital market considerations. He concludes
that under perfect capital markets a replacement rate of 50% is too high, and "[i]f there is no
lending or borrowing the optimal rates rise to about 75 %. 119
Davidson and Woodbury (1995, p. 1) examine optimal UI with "an equilibrium
search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments
and secondary sources. II Like Baily and Flemming they find that if potential UI duration
were infinite replacement rates should optimally be 50%. However, Davidson and
Woodbury also estimate that if potential duration is limited to the standard 26 weeks, then
the UI system should optimally replace all of lost earnings.
9 Flemming (1978, p. 403).
- 13 -
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2.4 Econometric Approaches: Applying Theory
Burgess and Kingston (1980) investigated the possibility of evaluating benefit
adequacy on the basis of readily available survey (Continuous Wage and Benefit History-
-CWBH) and claims data. They conclude, however, "that information on income and
household composition must be supplemented with actual or estimated data on household
expenditure patterns to predict individual benefit adequacy values with a reasonable degree of
accuracy" (U.S. Department of Labor 1981, p. 43). Other writers have presented results
which suggest a greater potential for econometric methods to yield reasonable estimates of
adequate UI compensation.
~shenfelter (19,80), in the context of a household model where unemployment is
treated as a rationing constraint, developed an approximation to a quantity which he refers to
(Ashenfelter 1980, p.552) as the "lump-sum compensation required to restore the unem-
ployed {rationed] worker's family to the welfare level of the fully employed family." This
approximation is arrived at by taking a second-order Taylor Series approximation of the
difference between the exogenous cost of achieving the unconstrained utility level in the
presence of the ration and the cost of achieving the same level in the absence of any
constraint, around the fully employed point. The result is "a conventional Harberger (1971)
type triangle measure of welfare loss" (Ashenfelter 1980, p. 553), which is applied to aggre-
gate time series data.
- 14 -
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Hurd (1980), who examined the cost of unemployment to the unemployed, used a
of approximation and direct methods to examine the experience of respondents to the
Survey of Economic Opportunity. He estimated the parameters of a Taylot Series
aPlJrOXlnnatlon of the substitution effect of a wage change on hours of work, integrated to
the compensated labor supply function, solved for the utility c'onstant wage acceptance
by inversion, and then determined the required lump sum compensation to constrained
by evaluating the area under this locus between the actual '(constrained) and fully
employed levels of labor supply.
O'Leary (1990) estimated the lump-sum compensation required to restore a single
unemployed person with no dependents to the welfare level of a fully employed worker using
a second-order Taylor Series approximation. lO Results presented in Ashenfelter (1980),
Hurd (1980), and O'Leary (1990) all suggest that the current UI practice of replacing one-
half lost wages tends to overcompensate short spells of unemployment and undercompensate
long spells.
2.5 A Consensus Standard
The norm of adequacy one-halffor four-fifths is rooted in the common-sense
recommendations of economists and politicians made over fifty years ago. The norm has'
tOJ'his paper draws heavily on arguments and results presented in O'Leary (1986, 1990).
Those previous studies of VI benefit adequacy focused on single workers without dependents.
- 15 -
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heen demonstrated to correspond roughly to the fundamental concern of satisfying needs of
the unemployed, as well as being consistent with the fiscal integrity of the program. It is
also appealing to policy makers and program managers because it is easy to apply. In the
final section this norm is reviewed in light of full unemployment compensation estimates.
The theoretical foundation for this exercise is laid in the next section.
3. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO FULL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
If the notion of a representative structure for individual pref~rences can be accepted, a
method for directly evaluating the required compensation to an individual constrained in
selling labor services is immediate. The method developed here is based on just such an
assumption and is in the spirit of work by Rosen (1978), who examined the excess burden of
income taxation, and Hurd and Pencavel (1981), who evaluated various wage subsidy
programs.
3.1 Consumer Behavior with Employment Constraints
Satisfaction of each consumer-worker is represented as depending simply on the
market resources at her command, Y, and the time availabl~ to enjoy these resources, L. It
is assumed that each individual, given her exogenous non-labor income, I, and the rate at
- 16 -
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~he reaches an optimum where H(w,I) hours of work are supplied to the market and Y(w,J)
endowment of discretionary time, L(w,l) = T - H(w,I). In (1) V(w,l) is the indirect utility
Using the above notation and denoting subscripts for married males and females as m and f
respectively, the following are labor supply equations for a household with a married couple
(1)
L,Y .
max { U(L,Y); Y = wH + I } = V(L(w,I) , Y(w,I».
EE-19
While the above exposition is stated in terms of individual behavior, the question of
- 17 -
The most common empirical specification of family labor supply treats the
work hours of married men as independent of the behavior or attributes of
their wives and the husband's behavior, in turn, as exogenous with respect to
the wife's work decision. Husband and wife maximize utility independently,
with the wife treating husband's earnings as property income. This results in
an asymmetric pair of labor supply functions [as stated below] with no cross
equation restrictions.
she can transform labor service8, H, into income, w, if unconstrained in the labor
market, acts in a manner consistent with the problem:
goods are consumed in her residual discretionary time, L(w,I). Denoting T as the
function, it represents the maximum level of satisfaction for given values of wand I.
summarized by Shelly Lundberg (1988, p. 225):
provide this viewpoint we follow the usual approach found in the economics literature as
appropriate unemployment compensation is best seen from the household perspective. To
where both partners work in the market: lIm = Hm(wm,I) and Hr = Hr<wr,I + wmHrJ.
Under these assumptions the analysis of unemployment compensation to individuals in a
household context may proceed using the model for individual consumer-worker behavior.
In many instances, the effective choice facing a consumer-worker is between working
a standard day, week, or year or not working at all; in other cases an optimal wage-hour
arrangement way be upset by an unexpected layoff. The analytic techniques required to
Investigate the effects of labor market constraints on consumer-worker behavior are formally
similar to the methods used to evaluate the response to "straight rationing. " Research on the
effects of rationing began during World War II (see Rothbarth 1940-41, and Kaldor 1941)
and has continued since (see Tobin-Houthakker 1950-51, Pollack 1971, and Ne41)' and
Roberts 1980).
Ashenfelter (1980) developed a model of household labor supply under rationing.
This model has been applied by Blundell and Walker (1982), Deaton and Muellbauer (1981),
Kneisner (1976), Parsons (1.977), and Ransom (1987). Ham (1982) presented results based
on a model of individual labor supply under rationing.
An individual faced with a binding constraint on the hours that he may sell in the
labor marketat,say, H < H(w,l)= T - L(w,I), achieves a utility level less than that
attainable in the absence of the labor market constraint,
U(T - H, wH + I) < U(L(w, I), Yew, I»,
or in terms of the indirect utility function,
VCR, wH + I) < V(w, I).
(2)
(3)
Full unemployment compensation to an individual who is constrained in selli~g labor services
is that lump sum grant, c, which solves:
- 18 -
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where c is a Hicksian equivalent variation. It is the lump sum compensation required by an
individual who is constrained in the labor market to make him as well off as if he were
employed at equilibrium hOYip~ without any change in relative prices. Therefore
The concept of full compensation embodied in this approach may be easily understood
by referring to the indifference curve analysis of Figure 2. An unconstrained individual,
with preferences as represented by the map of indifference curves on Figure 2, would reach
an unconstrained optimum equilibrium on UO at (LO, yo). If, for some reason, market
opportunities allow sales of only H = T - L I hours of labor services, a lower level of utility
is reached on U I at (LI,yl). While there is a hardship experienced as a result of the
associated earnings loss (yo - yl), the utility loss is partly compensated by an increase in
leisure, and the income required to fully compensate the constrained individual (Y - y l ) is
less than the earnings loss.
U(T - H, wH + I + c) = U(L(w,I), Y(w, I».
Stating this condition in terms of the indirect utility function,
V(H, wH + I + c) = V(w, I),
c = c(w, I, ill
is the compensation he would need to forego an opportunity to be employed at equilibrium
hours.
(4)
(5)
(6)
3.1 Explicit Formulae for Computing Full Compensation
The approach to measuring full compensation proceeds from the estimation of a
representative labor supply function. To compute an exact solution for full compensation
utility function parameter estimates -are required. For the model presented above, when the
- 19 -
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theoretical conditions required by neoclassical economic theory are satisfied utility function
parameters can be recovered from estimation of a labor supply specification.
Deriving an explicit closed form solution to (6) is not always an easy matter. Two
utility functions are used in this study, they are the familiar Stone-Geary (SG) which has
been used widely in employment policy research, and the somewhat less familiar utility
function derived by Hausman (1980) from the linear labor supply function. To crystalize the
approach, the Stone-Geary case is now worked out in detail.
3.1.1 Full Compensation when Utility is Stone-Geary
The Linear Expenditure System is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function:
U(L, Y) = aln(L - 1'1 - d) + (1 - a)ln(Y - 1'2); 0 < a < 1,
where the parameters a and (1 - a) are interpreted as marginal budget shares devoted to
leisure and market goods, and 1'1 and 1'2 represent leisure and income origin translation
parameters respectively, and d = aD with D the number of dependents and 0 the effect of
each dependent on the origin where leisure is defined. Maximizing' (7) subject to the
income, Y = wH + .I, and time, T = H + L constraints yields leisure demand,
(7)
. L = 1'1 + (alw)«wT + I) - W(I'I + d) - 1'2),
or labor supply,
H = (T - 1'1) - (alw)(I + w(T - 1'1 - d) - 1'2),
and commodity demand,
Y = 1'2 -t (1 - a)«wT + I) - W(I'I + d) - 1'2),
- 20 -
EE-22
(8a)
(8b)
(8c)
3.1.2 Full Compensation when Labor Supply is Linear
(13)
(12)
(10)
EE-23
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Yew, I) = eow{I.+ (alo)w - (alli) + (slo)},
H = aw + 01 + Z'Y,
Hausman (1980) has shown that when labor supply takes the following linear form:
c = y -1-wH+(l-a) {w(T-y """A) + (/_y )} X [a (w(T-y 1-a)+(I-y2)} ](l:U> (11)
2 1 2 w(T-H-y 1) .
with the variables H, wand I as defined above, Z representing socioeconomic variables such
as the number of dependents and a, 0 and 'Y being parameters to estimate, the indirect utility
function satisfying neoclassical conditions is:
a closed form solution for full unemployment compensation when utility is Stone-Geary.
the indirect Stone-Geary utility function. For this case the left-hand side of (5) is:
Equating (9) and (10) and solving for c yields:
functions. Given the adding up condition on neoclassical demand functions, the parameters
of (8a) through (8c) can be determined by estimating the parameters of anyone of the
demand system equations. Denoting the estimated parameter values by the parameters
. ,
themselves, substitution of (8a) and (8c) into the right-hand side of (4) yields the right-hand
side of equation (5),
where, s. = Z'Y, and the direct utility function consistent with the linear labor supply is:
U(L, Y) = e-[l + o(Y + ~)(b - H)]{(H - b)!o}, (14)
where b = odo and s = (s/o) - (a!02). In a different paper Hausman (1981) showed how
the'se specifications may be used to compute exact welfare measures at the individual level.
In the present case full compensation when labor supply is constrained to be H < H(w, I) is
the Hicksian equivalent variation, c, which may be computed by the following formula:
c=
{ow + [1 + o(wH + I + s)(b - H)]} + In{(oI + bwo - b + s)/(H - b)}
(-o(b - H)) (15)
4. SAMPLES, METHODS, AND BASIC ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1 The Samples
The basic estimation was performed on samples from the 1992 Current Population
Survey (CPS) Annual Demographic File. These data were collected in March of 1992, and
describe respondent behavior during 1991.
This study ultimately examines what full UI compensation might be for workers in
twelve different household situations. Six different categories of household member were
examined in households with and without dependents. A total of 33,454 households were
used for the basic estimations. This included:
11,739 households with married couples where both partners worked,
6,153 households with married couples where only the husband worked,
2,505 households with married couples where only the wife worked,
6,031 households with a single male working person, and
7,026 households with a single female working person.
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Parameters of the preference structure were estimated for one person in each of the
last four household types listed above, and for both partners among married couples where
both worked. This results in workers who were in six different categories of household
membership.
To ~ve at this sample for analysis we eliminated households with earners aged less
than 25 or more than 55 years, and examined only workers with positive earnings sometime
during 1991. We also excluded households with more than two earners. Among households
)Vithout a married couple we examined only those where there was one earner.
One of the most interesting aspects of household structure for our purposes is the
dependents relationships. There was an average of 1.4 dependents in households with
married couples where both partners worked and married couples with only the husband
working. In households with a married couple and only the wife working the average was
0.9 dependents, while there was an average 0.2 dependents for single males and 0.7
dependents for single females. In addition to information on dependents, the mean values of
annual hours worked, hourly wages, age, education, race, and urban residence status are
presented in Table 4. Not surprisingly the samples show that workers in households with
married couples and only one worker average about ten years older than househol9s with
married couples where both partners work, also the sample containing the largest fraction of
black households are those where there is a single woman working.
The family non-labor income figure of $34,953, for wives in households where
married spouses both work reflects 'the assumption that Shelly Lundberg (1988, p. 225) says
is "the most common empirical specification"--labor income of husbands is regarded by
working wives as part of exogenous income. The relative size of the means to the standard
deviations of family nori-Iabor income for the sub-samples indicates that for some households
non-labor income is negative. This is because the CPS household non-labor income variable
includes self-employment income and rental income, each of which may reasonably be
negative in a given year.
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Given the great diversity of American households, the sample selection restrictions
are admittedly severe. However, even within the five narrowly defined household types
examined there are many different dependent relationships so that the categories of household
member multiply quickly. Assigning dependency relationships and ,non-labor income
becomes quite complicated for other household structures. .Not every possible combination
can be examined; information yielded from examination of the household categories selected
is rich and varied.
4.2 Estimation Methods
The parameter estimates which serve as the basis for compensation simulations are
reported in Table 5. The equations estimated are similar in that each has a very small
coefficient of determination. This is typical when estimating labor supply equations on cross-
section data. While several omitted factors obviously explain the total 'variation in annual
hours worked, every individual parameter in these equations is estimated with a high degree
of statistical significance. Furthermore, these estimates are quite robust, being relatively
invariant when other regressors were included. The parsimonious specifications were chosen
for simplicity.
The labor supply specifications (8b) and (12) were each estimated on the six different
samples of workers described above. The labor supply equations were estimated using
ordinary least squares, correcting for the division. bias problem involved in defining the
hourly wage rate using the method proposed by Borjas (1980). In the labor supply
regression equations the dependent variable, annual hours, is definitionally related to the
important predictor, the hourly wage rate, since the latter is defined by dividing the former
into annual earnings. To avoid the bias in parameter estimates which may result from
division bias, first stage wage equations are run. Results of these estimations are reported in
Table 6. All parameters in the wage equations were estimated with great precision, and
overall the equations fit the data quite well. Wages were modeled as depencHng on age,
education, race and urban residency status. These predictor variables were not later included
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in the hours equations so as to satisfy identification of the system and to avoid
multicollinearity with the predicted wage.
All results in this study are based on empirical labor supply equations, which include
only variables suggested, by the theory which in this case includes the number of dependents.
The number of dependents was incorporated into the two utility functions examined since
dependency status is an important consideration in estimating UI benefit adequacy.
4.3 Basic Estimation Re.'\l~ts
The direct utilityfunction (14) derived by Hausman (1980) suggests no natural
interpretations of the parameters estimated for the linear labor supply function and presented
in Table 5. Interpretation of these results is limited to discussion of elasticities. On the
other hand there are natural interpretations of the parameters of the Stone-Geary labor supply
function reported in Table 7.
The budget share devoted to leisure is greatest for married males and single female
workers. The complementary group of married women and single men, who have relatively
lower valued market uses of time, have relatively higher minimum leisure requirements.
Estimated minimum income requirements are large and negative for all groups. As
mentioned earlier negative values are possible because the exogenous household income
variable includes losses from self employment and rental property. The relative magnitudes
of the estimated 1'2 across household types are reasonable. .Working married males in one
earner households have the hjghest subsistence income requirements, while married women
in dual earner households have the lowest requirement. 11
llPollowing the usual practice in the literature (Lundberg, 1988, p. 225) of adding
husbands earnings to working wives non-labor income, as seen in Table 4, married women in
dual earner households also have th.e greatest mean and standard deviation in exogenous non-
labor income. This obViously drives the 1'2 estimate.
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The labor supply equation estimates presented in Table 5 indicate that dependents
increase hours of labor supplied .by men, and decrease hours offered to the market by
women. These results are given a finer interpretation in Table 7 where estimates for 0, the
Stone-Geary utility fun9tion parameter indicating the minimum leisure required per
dependent,are reported. The~stimates indicate that an additional dependent reduces the
minimllm leisure required by a working woman with a working spouse by 119 hours per
year, while increasing the minimum leisure required by married men whose spouse does not
work by 123 hours per year.
Estimates of the structural Coumot (uncompensated) wage effect, income effect,
substitution effect, and associated elasticities are presented in Table 8 for the Stone-Geary
form and Table 9 for the Linear form. The labor supply estimation results are most easily
reviewed in elasticity terms. For both the Stone-Geary and the Linear specifications, the
elasticity estimates are consistent with the implication of consumer demand theory that the
substitution effect on labor supply is positive. Furthermore, in each case leisure is found to
be a normal good. Generally speaking, the Stone-Geary specification yields results more
consistent with the received literature. The Linear form results in a relatively high labor
supply elasticity for married men who are .the sole earner in the household, this group is
usually found to have the least elastic labor supply. Using the Stone-Geary specification, the
labor supply elasticity estimate of married male sole earners falls to less than half that from
the linear specification. Other estimates generated from the Stone-Geary model are also
more in line with previous st~dies.
5~ ESTIMATES OF FULL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
In this section full compensation estimates· based on the formulae (11) and (15) given
in Section 3 are presented for various hypothetical degrees of labor market constraint. These
~gures are reported together with UI payment simulation results for four states having
benefit computation provisions which span the variety of systems extant and an estimate of
compensation which would result if one-half of lost wages were repl~ced-.-which is the
standard norm of adequacy.
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Under all state Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws, a claimant's benefit rights
depend on four principal factors: "the amount of employment and wages' required to.
qualify an individual for benefits, the period for earning such wages, the method of
computing the weekly benefit amount, and the method of determining the length of time
for which benefits may be paid. "12 Another factor which is an important determinant of
benefits in 14 Statf:S is dependents aliowances. While the level of wages and period of
employmentfor qualification differ greatly across the states, there exist only four basic
schemes for determining a UI claimant's weekly benefit amount. They are referred to as
the Average-weekly-wage, High-quarter, Multi-quarter, and Annual-wage formulae.
Results of simple simulations, performed under the assumption of qualification for
the maximum benefit payment period, are presented for state programs representative of
each of the four benefit schemes: Michigan provisions are used to perform Average-week-
ly-wage simulations, Massachusetts laws provide the parameters to do High-quarter
simulations, Illinois serves as an example of a Multi-quarter state, and Oregon's scheme is
used to generate Annual-wage simulations. The particulars of the four categories of
benefit rights provisions in each of these states are summarized in Table 10. The third
section of the table highlights the distinguishing characteristics of the four different state
benefit schemes. Under each scheme a formula is employed which yields a weekly benefit
amount (WBA) which is equal to about one-half of lost gross wages. Under the Michigan
plan seventy percent of the net AWW is paid; in Massachusetts a fraction between 1/21
and 1/26 of the HQ earnings is the WBA 13; in Illinois 49 percent of earnings in the two
highest quarters in the base period divided by 26; and in Oregon the WBA is 1.25 percent
of annual income.
12Comparison ofState VI Laws, U.S. Department of Labor (1992, p. 3-1).
13The fraction 1/26 is used in the Massachusetts simulations because the statutory
alternative of 1/52 of the highest two quarters yields the same WBA in our simulations since
we use average quarterly earnings computed as annual earnings divided by four.
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Tables 11-16 present simulation results for the four states, the one-half wage
replacement rule, and for the two preference structures considered; Each table is divided
into two parts, the left hand panel gives results for workers with no dependents, the right
hand panel gives results for workers with two dependents. In each table the left most
column lists the hypothetical number of weeks of unemployment (Weeks), which is
allowed to range from one to t.hirty-one because among the simulation states the maximum
entitled duration of regular benefits is 30 weeks in Massachusetts which also has a one
week waiting period. The next foufcolumns report the cumulative .benefit payments
which would be made to a qualified claimant in Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, and
Oregon with the various weeks of unemployment, and sub-sample average gross hourly
wages for the si~ categories of worker reported in Table 4. Column six reports a dollar
amount which equals half of the total gross wages lost by a worker with, the 'mean wage
rate, and mean non-labor income. The seventh and eighth columns present the amount of
"full" compensation implied by the closed form direct compensation formula for the Stone-
Geary and Lin,ear specifications respectively. The right panel in each table presents
similar simulation results with the change that the hypothetical worker has two dependents
instead of none.
In Michigan there is no waiting period before benefit payments begin. However, in
Massachusetts, Illinois and Oregon the benefit payment is zero during the first full week of
unemployment, with this waiting period acting as a form of coinsurance. The one-week
waiting period was required in all but eleven states in 1991. 14 In all states, once benefit
payments commence, total benefits increase in a linear fashion, with a fixed benefit
amount being paid each week, until there is either a return to work or the claimant is no
longer eligible. The one-half wage replacement rule results in a fi~ed benefit payment
each week as well.
14The other ten states' without a waiting week in 1991 were: Alabama, Connecticut,
Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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It is assumed in the simulations performed here that the stylized claimant
considered qualifies for the maximum benefit period. In the absence of economic
conditions which trigger extended benefits, 26 weeks is the maximum benefit duration
under most UI programs. IS As a consequence of the waiting period and the benefit
maximums, the figures in the simulation tables for Illinois and Oregon are constant for
weeks of u~employmentbeyond twenty-seven, for Michigan there is no change after 26
weeks because Michigan has a maximum entitlement of 26 weeks and no waiting week,
cumulative compensation reaches a maximum in Massachusetts after 31 weeks. lust as the
• UI benefit totals increase in a linear fashion, so do the totals for one-half gross wage
replacement (HALF).
In the simulations the generally accepted norm of benefit adequacy--one-haifwage
replacement--is met or slightly exceeded in all four states for workers with relatively low
earnings. .That is for the three categories of woman worker. The mean hourly wages
across the three groups of woman worker were all approximately equal to $10.50, while
the mean hourly wages for men were somewhat higher. The mean wages for both
categories of married men, single earner ($16.47) and dual earner ($14.89) households,
were too high to allow the average worker to qualify for half wage replacement. in any of
the states. However, single males who had mean hourly earnings of $13.24 wo~ld be
provided with approximately half wage replacement when unemployed in either Michigan
or Massachusetts. Natu·rally, in the simulations the waiting week delays wage replacement
in Massachusetts, -Illinois, and Oregon, but not in Michigan.
Differentiating each compensation formula with respect to hours, H, reveals that it
is in general impossible to determine a priori how a change in hours of work affects utility
based compensation. Comparing simulation results for "full" compensation from the
theoretical formulae based on Stone-Geary and integrated Linear utility, with the figures
for the actual benefit payments which would be forthcoming in the various states, the
ISThe exceptions (maximum duration in weeks) are: Louisiana (28), Massachusetts (30),
Pennsylvania (30), Puerto Rico (20), Utah (36), Virginia (28), Washington, D.C. (34), and
West Virginia (28).
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general result is that current UI programs appear to overcompensate for wage loss during
the first several weeks of unemployment and undercompensate for lengthy spells of
unemployment.
The Stone-Geary form yields full compensation simulation estimates which nearly
coincide with the one-half wage replacement rule for long durations of unemployment, but
suggests that the states and the half-wage replacement formula is too generous in early
weeks of unemployment.
Results based on the Linear form of labor supply generally accentuate the
tendencies of the Stone-Geary simulation suggesting that compensation should \>e lower
than the accepted norm in early weeks. However, for long durations of unemployment the
Linear form suggests that compensation may safely be much higher than one-half wage
replacement.
For a few categories of worker, simulation results based on the theoretical formulae
have a surprising non-monotonic shape. For working husbands with non-working wives
the pattern is exhibited for both the Stone-Geary and the Linear based formulae for men
both with and without other dependents. For the Stone-Geary form the pattern is also
apparent for single men with two dependents, and for the Linear form the pattern appears
for married women workers with a working spouse and two dependents. In all of these
cases the pattern is generally the same--full compensation in the first week of
unemployment should be positive though not large, with cumulative full compensation
declining for additional weeks of unemployment until it reaches zero in the early weeks of
a spell and then rises thereafter. These results occur because of the non-linear form of the
compensation formulae and the relative magnitude of th.e parameter estimates. The
estimates suggest that the timing of benefit payments should be closely examined.
Ignoring possible en.try effects which may be created, the results suggest that the waiting
period might be placed after the first weeks of compensation.
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It is surprising that results on dependents allowances from the theoretical
compensation formulae are not more consistent given that the dependents variable in the
labor supply equations yielded the usual results found in the literature--independent of the
household structure, because of strong income effects for men dependents tend to increase
hours of market work for males, and perhaps because they more significantly raise the
opportunity cost of working for women; dependents decrease hours of market work for
females. For the Stone-Geary form adding dependents to the household lowers required
full compensation for men and raises full compensation required for women,while
precisely the opposite occc-; for the Linear form with dependents lowering full
compensation to women workers and raising full compensation.
Naturally, the conflicting simulation results across functional forms for dependents
is due to the differing treatment of demographic variables in the compensation formulae.
The result highlights the extreme sensitivity of the simulation results to the specifications.
Taken together, the simulation results based on the theoretical specifications tend to be in
the neighborhood of the standard norm of one-half wage replacement which is
approximately what states provide for beneficiaries qualifying for less than the maximum
weekly benefit amount. Results based on the Stone-Geary are slightly below and those
based on the Linear form are somewhat. above half wage replacement. Rather than
contradict the standard norm of adequacy, these results tend to support the one-half wage
replacement rule. If the theoretical simulation results raise any questions, they are about
the best timing of payments.
6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS.
Results from estimating explicit parameterizations of labor supply have been used
to compute estimates for full unemployment compensation. The estimates generated were
compared to hypothetical payments which would accrue under the unemployment insurance
(UI) systems of representative states. Results on compensation amounts tend to support
the accepted standard of UI benefit adequacy which calls for replacement of one-half of
lost wages. While one-half wage replacement over the course of an average 15 week spell
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of unemployment appears to yield adequate and not excessive wage replacement, return to
work incentives might be improved if the fixed nature of the weekly payment is examined.
There may be ways to maintain or improve benefit adequacy while speeding return to
work. This might be accomplished in part by a closer examination of partial benefit rules.
The direct compensation and state program simulations imply that current UI
programs overcompensate for wage loss during short spells of unemployment, and
under-compensate for lengthy spells. Overall, compensation is adequate in the present UI
system, but the timing of payments should be more closely examined. Particular program
features to consider are the length and timing of the waiting period.
Findings in this stu'dy concerning dependents allowances were extremely cloudy.
The two different theoretical specifications produced opposite results. What the results
suggested was that dependents affect required compensation to men and women in exactly
opposite ways· regardless of the household setting where the man or woman lives. It may
require Solomon to craft a benefit policy which treats men and women differently in terms
of dependents, and is still politically acceptable.
For the 12 different types of representat'ive worker considered in this study, benefit
simulations were performed for four representative states: Michigan, Massachusetts,
Illinois, and Oregon. Among the 48 cases examined at least one-"half of lost weekly
earnings would be replaced during a week of unemployment in 24 of the cases. Clearly,
each 'of the 48 cases is not equally likely to occur in practice. The four states studied .
differ greatly in size, and the probabilities of unemployment for' each of the twelve types
of household member differ as well. In the simulations one-half wage replacement is most
likely to occur for women and single men, with dependents allowances greatly increasing
the chance of one-half wage replacement. In 1993 single Americans were more than twice
~s likely to experience unemployment than were married people, and among women those
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with dependents were more likely to be unemployed. 16 This suggests that unemployment
is a greater risk for those more likely to be adequately compensated by the UI system.
Since the 1950s a popular standard of unemployment insurance benefitadequacyis
half wage replacement for eighty percent of the insured unemployed or one-halffor four-
fifths. Given that between the minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts
approximately one-half of lost wages are replaced, an important part of benefit adequacy
concerns maximum benefit amount policy. Obviously raising the maximum weekly benefit
amount (WBA). would allow one-half wage replacement to extend to more beneficiaries.
In Table 17 we see that for the six worker types drawn from the 1992 Current Population
Survey (CPS) and examined in this paper,17 setting the maximum WBA at two-thirds the
full sample average weekly wage (AWW) would extend one-half wage replacement to 77
percent of the population. The maximum WBA would need to beat about 71 percent of
the AWW to allow on.e-halffor four-fifths. Among working married women with
husbands not working, the standard -of adequacy would be reached with the maximum
WBA at fifty percent of the AWW, while for working married men with wives not
working setting the maximum a~ seventy-five percent of the AWW would still fall short of
the adequacy standard. Clearly, earnings levels are different for the various categories of
earners. Table 18 states what maximum WBA combined with fifty percent wage
replacement below the maximum would yield on.e-halffor four-fifths for each of the six
~tegories of worker considered in this study.
Raising the maximum WBA is not a simple matter, adjustments of this parameter
should always be considered in the larger context of VI trust fund agequacy. As Vroman
(1990, p. 114) points out "symmetric treatment. ..of taxes. and benefits... helps to reduce the
_risk of insolvency." It is generally believed that if the maximum weekly benefit amount is
16 Data from Table 1 in the 1993 Geographic Profile ofEmployment and Unemployment
and Table 626 in the 1994 Statistical Abstract of the Un.ited States.
17There are six different worker types when the two alternative dependents possibilities
are ignored.
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set at two-thirds of the state average weekly wage,one-half wage replacement will be
achieved for eighty percent of benefi~iaries. Regarding maximum benefit amount policy
Minnesota and Oklahoma should be studied as models. In Oklahoma, for example, the
maximum weekly benefit amount is adjusted annually to a percentage between 60 and 67
percent of the state average weekly wage depending on the state UI trust fund balance.
While it was mentioned in this paper when reviewing earlier research but not
analyzed, benefit adequacy also concerns those with low levels of prior earnings. Because
"necessary and obligated" expenditures amount to a larger share of earnings for low
income people, one-half wage replacement may be inadequate for this group. Programs
which tie the mi~imum weekly benefit amount (WBA) to the maximum WBA amount
should be closely examined. Kansas, where the minimum WBA is set at 25 percent of the
maximum WBA, offers a useful approach to minimum WBA policy.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Average Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR)
in the United States, 1938-'1994.
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2. A graphic representation of full unemployment
compensation', as a Hicksian equivalent variation.
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Table 1
Average UI Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA),
and Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR) in the United States, 1938-1993.-
Year WBA WRR Year WBA WRR
1938 10.94 0.431 1966 39.76 0.347
1939 10.66 0.408 1967 41.25 0.347
1940 10.56 0.391 1968 43.43 0.343
1941 11.06 0.366 1969 46.17 0.344
1942 12.66 0.353 1970 50.31 0.357
1943 13.84 0.336 1971 54.35 0.365
1944 15.90 0.359 1972 55.82 0.361
1945 18.77 0.416 1973 59.00 0.361
1946 18.50 0.396 1974 64.25 0.365
1947 17.83 0.346 1975 70.23 0.371
1948 19.03 0.341 1976 75.16 0.371
1949 20.48 0.360 1977 78.71 0.364
1950 20.76 0.344 1978 83.67 0.364
1951 21.09 0.322 1979 89.68 0.361
1952 22.79 0.330 1980 98.95 0.364
1953 23.58 0.323 1981 106.61 ' 0.359
1954 24.93 0.335 1982 119.34 0.371
1955 25.04 0.321 1983 123.59 0.368
1956 27.02 0.333 1984 123.47 0.353
1957 28.17 0.335 1985 128.23 0.351
1958 30.54 0.353 1986 135.72 0.357
1959 30.40 0.334 1987 139.74 0.352
1960 32.87 0.352 1988 144.91 0.348
1961 33.80 0.354 1989 151.76 0.355
1962 34.56 0.349 1990 161.56 0.361
1963 35.28 0.346 1991 169.88 0.364
1964 35.96 0.338 1992 173.64 0.354
1965 37.19 0.338 1993 179.69 0.369
1994 181.53 0.361
- Source: UI Financial Data, ET Handbook No. 394, United States Department of Labor, Employment
and Training Administration (1992). Figures for 1993 and 1994 averaged from the four
quarterly issues of VI Data Summary, United States Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration (1993, 1994).
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Table 2
State Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR), 1994
State Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (MWBA), Jan 1993
as a Fraction of State Average Weekly Wage (AWW), 1992
and Any Statutory Rule for MWBA as a Fraction of AWW
State WRR MWBA .MWBAlAWW Statutory Rule
Alabama 0.312 165 0.394
Alaska 0.278 212' 0.370
Arizona 0.333 185 0.423
Arkansas 0.423 212 0.564 66 2/3
California 0.268 230 0.421
Colorado 0.405 250 0.526 55
Connecticut 0.330 306 0.487 60
Delaware 0.339 245 0.474
District of Columbia 0.316 335 0.500 11
Florida 0.3':~ 250 0.576
Georgia 0.33( 185 0.393
Hawaii 0.537 322 0.685 70
Idaho 0.414 223 0.573 60
Illinois 0.360 227 0.423 49.5
Indiana 0.360 140 0.310
Iowa 0.447 200 0.505 53
Kansas 0.435 239 0.575 60
Kentucky 0.379 217 0.525 55
Louisiana 0.274 181 0.418 66 2/3
Maine 0.384 198 0.490 52
Maryland 0.345 223 0.445
Massachusetts 0.410 312 0.548 57.5
Michigan 0.379 293 0.554 58
. Minnesota 0.441 279 0.578 50-60%
Mississippi 0.343 165 0.453
Missouri 0.329 175 0.390
Montana 0.413 209 0.579 60
Nebraska 0.363 154 0.404
Nevada 0.383 217 0.472 50
New Hampshire 0.312 188 0.395
New Jersey 0.393 325 0.526 562/3
New Mexico 0.372 191 0.495 50
New York 0.321 300 0.472
North Carolina 0.419 267 0.637 66 2/3
North Dakota 0.435 212 0.596 60
Ohio 0.389 228 0.486
Oklahoma 0.407 229 0.559 60-66 2/3
Oregon 0.396 271 0.615 64
Pennsylvania 0.419 317 0.651 66 2/3
Puerto Rico 0.320 133 0.485 50
Rhode Island . 0.465 294 0.653 67
South Carolina 0.370 191 0.474 66 2/3
South Dakota 0.397 154 0.467 50
Tennessee 0.334 170 0.393
Texas 0.378 245 0.504
Utah 0.438 240 0.584 60
Vermont 0.370 199 0.469
Virginia 0.360 208 0.447
Virgin Islands 0.484 203 0.494 50
Washington 0.412 273 0.572 70
West Virginia 0.393 270 0.643 662/3
IWisconsin 0.417 240 0.553
Wyoming 0.416 200 0.500 55
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Table 3
Experience of Single VI Beneficiaries
Selected from Five Benefit Adequacy Surveys, 1956-1958.&
Survey
Tampa
Anderson
Albany
Portland
St. Louis
·Source:
pcroW' PcrNWC PCTNI)d PcrMAXC WRRf
28 65 95 21 .46
51 84 118 37 .56
51 72 114 46 .54
52 79 118 42 .58
34 58 106 49 .48
Becker (1980), Table 1, pp. 11-12.
.31
.36
.34
.39
.33
bPcroW:
epcrNW:
clpcrND:
CpCTMAX:
'WRR:
'SWRR:
Percent of beneficiaries whose benefits were half or more of their gross wage.
Percent of beneficiaries whose benefits were half or more of their net wage.
Average benefit as a percent of average non-deferrable expenditures.
Percent of beneficiaries who received the maximum benefit amount.
Ratio of average weekly benefit amount in state to average weekly net wage of recipients.
Ratio of average weekly benefit amount in state to average weekly wage in state covered
employment.
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Table 4
Means of Characteristics of the Samples Selected from the
1992 Current Population Survey Annual Demographic File by Household Type
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Household 'type
Married Both Working Married One Working Single
Characteristics Husbands I Wives Husbands I Wives Males I Females
Annual Hours Worked 2,165 1,650 2,053 1,560 2,015 1,887
(589) (705) (731) (755) (670) (653)
Hourly Wage 14.89 10.64 16047 10.50 13.24 10.51
(9.12) (10.07) (18.67) (12.25) (28.65) (6.87)
Family Non-labor Income 2,867 34,953 6,361 10,297 1,862 2,394
(7,225) (21,730) (13,992) (15,881) (7,372) (5,521)
Number of Dependents 104 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.7
(1.2) (1.2) (104) (1.1) (0.6) (1.0)
Age in Years 38.8 36.8 4404 46.7 36.0 37.1
(7.7) (7.3) (13.6) (12.8) (8.1) (8.2)
Education (proportion in Category)
8 years or less 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.03
(0.17) (0.15) (0.29) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18)
9 to 12 years 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08
(0.25) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27)
High School grad 0.34 0.37 0.34 0041 0.33 0.33
(0.47) (0.48) (0047) (0.49) (0.47) (0047)
Some college 0.19 . 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.20
(0.39) (0.39) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.40)
Associates degree 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
(0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28)
Bachelors degree 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.18
(0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.34) (0.39) (0.39)
Advanced degree 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.09
(0.32) (0.27) (0.32) (0.26) (0.29) (0.29)
Race (Proportion in Category)
White 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.80
(0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.36) (0040)
Black 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.17
(0.25) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.32) (0.37)
Other 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.19) (0.2{) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
Urban Resident 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.65 0.80 0.81
(proportion in Category) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.48) (0040) (0.39)
Sample Size 11,739 11,739 6,153 2,505 6,031 7,026
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Table 5
Labor Supply Equation Regression Results by Household Type
(standard errors in parentheses)
Household Type
Married Both Working Married One Working Single
Independent Variable' Husbands I Wives Husbands I Wives Males I Females
. ..
.. .....
.........
.~:::: .';'::
....:...:-
Intercept
Family Non-Labor Income
Predicted Hourly Wage (I/~
Reciprocal of Predicted
A
Hourly Wage (1Iv.)
Number of Dependents
2,503.69
(20.00)
-0.14
(0.01)
-4,530.18
(259.08)
9.45
(4.51)
0.033
2,132.16
(24.58)
-0.04
(0.00)
-1,936.67
(212.82)
-114.74
(5.32)
0.061
2,105.40
(17.66)
-0.26
(0.01)
-1,223.32
(160.99)
90.97
(6.65)
0.114
1,887.51
(50.89)
-0.08
(0.01)
-1,932.67
(442.00)
-44.27
(13.38)
0.031
2,360.79
(28.62)
-0.13
(0.02)
-4,100.35
(332.10)
43.09
(15.33)
0.032
2,343.38
(23.80)
-0.25
(0.02)
-3,631.54
(221.14)
-31.16
(7.60)
0.086
<Linear Form
Intercept
Predicted Hourly Wage (~
Family Non-labor Income (I)
Number of Dependents
Sample Size
1,773.26
(23.18)
26.83
(1.43)
-0.01
(0.00)
8.17
(4.50)
0.031
11,739
1,614.94
(24.68)
30.21
(2.18)
-0.004
(0.000)
-114.98
(5.31)
0.062
11,739
1,585.72
(27.65)
25.38
(1.47)
-0.01
(0.00)
99.26
(6.62)
0.128
6,153
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1,345.47
. (47.85)
29.53
(4.18)
-0.01
(0.00)
-39.34
(13.32)
0.029
2,505
1,610.23
(33.19)
30.90
(2.42)
...Q.Ol
(0.00)
43.59
(15.37)
0.029
6,031
1,484.71
(29.00)
44.92
(2.55)
-0.02
(0.00)
-36.84
(7.63)
0.075
7,026
-0.02
(0.57)
0.10
(0.01)
Females
. Single
Males
0.62
(2.56)
0.15
(0.05)
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
-1.54 2.11 -0.72 2.96
(0.61) (0.75) (1.18) (1.49)
0.21 0.06 0.17 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Household Type
Married Both· Working Married One Working
Table 6
Wage Equation Regression Results by Household Type
(standard errors in parentheses)
9 to 12 years 2.64 1.06 2.35 1.45 2.23 1.38
(0.53) (0.68) (1.02) (1.29) (2.11) (0.48)
High School grad 4.48 2.69 5.79 2.66 4.61 3.18
(0.45) (0.59) (0.84) (1.11) (1.78) (0.42)
Some college 5.77 3.98 7.96 3.92 6.45 4.70
(0.47) (0.61) (0.95) (1.21) (1.86) (0.43)
Associates degree 6.86 6.35 10.13 5.82 6.71 5.71
(0.51) (0.64) (1.27) (1.38) (2.20) (0.48)
Bachelors degree 9.25 7.24 13.25 9.19 10.40 8.05
(0.47) (0.61) (0.94) (1.24) (1.86) (0.44)
Advanced degree 12.15 11.47 19.08 12.39 11.63 10.42
(0.49) (0.65) (1.01) (1.37) (2.04) (0.47)
Black -1.72 -0.48 -3.40 -1.45 -1.98 -0.70
(0.30) (0.36) (1.12) (0.99) (1.18) (0.20)
Other -0.71 -0.25 -1.57 -0.44 -1.15 -0.17
(0.40) (0.44) (1.12) (1.34) (1.83) (0.38)
2.81 2.15 2.56 2.60 1.50 2.32
(0.18) (0.20) (0.53) (0.49) (0.93) (0.19)
R2 0.176 0.095 0.109 0.082 0.014 0.197
Sample Size 11,739 11,739 6,153 2,505 6,03-1 7,026
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Table 7
Stone-Geary Utility Function Parameter Estimates by Household Type
(standard errors in parentheses)
Household Type
Married Both Working Married One Working Single
Husbands I Husbands I , IParameter Wives Wives Males Females
ex 0.139 0.037 0.262 0.082 0.133 0.246
(0.012) (0.003) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016)
1'1 5,854.7 6,547.0 5,907.1 6,704.1 6,038.5 5,653.6
(51.2) (29.2) (61.9) , (65.0) (69.1) (74.1)
1'2 -32,774.2 -53,028.0 -4,668.7 -23,601.0 -30,933.5 -14,786.5
(3,416.9) (7,908.7) (654.7) (6,495.7) (4,796.8) (1,314.7)
0 11.0 -119.1 123.3 -48.2 49.7 -41.3
(5.2) (5.5) (8.8) (14.7) (17.7) (9.9)
R2 0.033 0.052 0.114 0.031 0.032 0.086
Mean Number of 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.7Dependents
Sample Size 11,739 11,739 6,153 2,505 6,031 7,026
ex - Share of full budget devoted to leisure.
1'1 - Minimum leisure required before utility is defined.
1'2 ,- Minimum income required before utility is defined.
0 - Minimum leisure required per dependent.
Ii = oD - Minimum leisure (non-market time) required fordependents.
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Household Type
Table 8
Partial Effect and Elasticity Estimates of Labor Supply Implied by the
Stone-Geary Utility Function·for Various Household Types
(standard errors in parentheses)
25.187 24.788
(4.055) (1.913)
(oHloI)b -0.003 -0.016 -0.008 -0.010 -0.023
(0.000) . (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SC: 42.321 34.041 43.306 37.358 44.953 82.332
(1.975)
(flH.w) cI 0.153 0.183 0.085 0.169 0.163 0.213
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.027) (0.013) (0.011)
(flH.r) e -0.012 -0.073 -0.049 -0.051 -0.009 -0.030
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
(flJ.w) ( 0.291 0.220 0.348 0.251 0.295 0.458(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.028) (0.022) (0.019)
_ - A 21,655 1,650 2,053 1,560 2,014 1,887H = H(w, I, B)
Mean Hourly Wage (w) 14.89 10.64 16.47 10.50 13.24 10.51
Mean Household 2,867 34,953 6,361 10,297 1,862 2,394Non-labor Income (1)
Sample Size 11,739 11,739 6,153 2,505 6,031 7,026
• (oHlow) = Coumot wage effect
b (oHIo!) = pure income effect
c: S = .substitution effect = (oHlow) - H(oHloI)
cI (17H....) = wage elasticity = (oHlow)(w/H)
e (17H..> = income elasticity = (oHloI)(I/H)
( (17 I H...,) = substitution elasticity
= (17H....) - (WH/I)(17H..>
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Table 9
Partial Effect and Elasticity Estimates of Labor Supply Implied by the
Linear Labor Supply Function for Various Household Types
Household Type
Effect
Married Both Working Married One Working
Husbands I Wives Husbands I Wives
Single
Males I Females
;'.:.': -
.............. ;;::<?:::::~::: :::{/ :'/<:';;'"
(oHlow)a 26.827 30.205 25.380 29.532
(1.430) (2.180) (1.474) (4.185)
(oHlol)b -0.007 -0.003 -0.014 -0.006
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
SC 41.418 36.044 54.040 38.637
(2.368) (2.410) (2.260) (4.672)
('YJH.w> d 0.185 0.195 0.204 0.199
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.028)
('YJH./) e -0.009 -0.075 -0.043 -0.039(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
('YJJ.W),r
-0.285 0.233 0.434 0.260
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.031)
- - ,., 2,165 1,650 2,053 1,560H=H(w,I,B)
Mean Hourly Wage (w) 14.89 10.64 16.47 10.50
Mean Household 2,867 34,953 6,361 10,297Non-labor Income (l)
Sample Size 11,739 11,739 6,153 2,505
a (oHlow) = Coumot wage effect
b (oH/oI) = pure income effect
c S = substitution effect = (oHlow) - H(oHloI)
d (71H....) = wage ela'.iticity = (oHlow)(w/H)
e (71H.J = income elasticity = ,(oHloI)(I/H)
r (71IH....) = substitution elasticity
= ('7H....) - (WHI 1)(71H.J
30.898
(2.416)
-0.006'
(0.001)
43.938
(3.600)
0.203
(0.016)
-0.006
(0.001)
0.289
(0.024)
2,014
13.24
1,862
6,031
44.923
(2.545)
-0.019
(0.001)
80.909
(3.927)
0.250
(0.014)
-0.024
(0.002)
0.451
(0.022)
1,887
10.51
2,394
7,026
Table 10
Benefit Rights Provisions in the. State 'DI t.aws
of Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Oregon for the year 1991&
Entitled Benefit Duration:
Provisions for Dependents:
Number of dependents
is taken into account
in after-tax weekly
wage calculation.
5
$ 333
NS
26
$6,422
$57 - $247
Oregon
Annual-wage
(OR)
$1,000 in BP
1st 4 of last 5
quarters
$19,760 in BP
18 weeks in BP
0.0125 x AWW
26
$1,600
NS
Illinois
Multi-quarter
(lL)
1st 4 of last
5 quarters
$1,600 in BP
$10,881 in BP
26
$5,356-$7,020
5 % of 2 highest
quarters divided
by 26.
49 % of 2 highest
quarters / 26
$51 - ($206 - $270)
NS
10
$ 432
Massachusetts
High.;quarter
(MA)
30x WBA
30
$8,460-$12,690
1/21 to 1/26
of HQ earnings
+ dependant's
allowance
($14,$21) - ($282,
$423)
$7,332 in HQ
52 weeks preceding
BY
$25 per dependent,
up to $141.
15
$ 825
26
$7,176 .
0.7 x Net AWW
20 weeks in BP
$10,840 in ~P
$59 - $276
20x30x min. wage
52 weekS preceding
BY
Michigan
Average-weekly-wage
(1\11)
Weeks
Dollars
Weeks
Dollars
Max:
Min:
• Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1992), "Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws", Manpower
Ad~stration,Unemployment Insurance Service, January.
BY: Benefit Year
WBA: Weekly Benefit Amount
BP: Base Period
NS: Not specified in the particular state law.
HQ: High Quarter
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Table 11
Ut;temployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars
for Married Men with a Working SpouseR
Wecks Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear
1 ' 276 0 0 0 327 30 13 276 0 0 0 327 13 29
2 552 282 206 247 653 100 72 552 376 270 247 653 66 105
3 828 564 412 494 980 205 178 828 752 540 494 980 156 229
4 1,104 846 618 741 1,306 341 333 1,104 t,128 810 741 1,306 280 401
5 1,380 1,128 824 988 1,633 506 536 1,380 1,504 1,080 988 1,633 434 622
6 1,656 1,410 1,030 1,235 1,959 696 788 1,656 1,880 1,350 1,235 1,959 614 892
7 1,932 1,692 1,236 1,482 2,286 910 1,090 1,932 2,256 1,620 1,482 2,286 818 1,211
8 2,208 1,974 1,442 1,729 2,612 1,145 1,441 2,208 2,632 1,890 1,729 2,612 1,045 1,579
9 2,484 2,256 1,648 1,976 2,939 1,399 1,842 2,484 3,008 2,160 1,976 2,939 1,292 1,998
10 2,760 2,538 1,854 2,223 3,265 1,671 2,294 2,760 3,384 2,430 2,223 3,265 1,557 2,467
11 3,036 2,820 2,060 2,470 3,592 1,959 2,796 3,036 3,760 2,700 2,470 3,592 1,839 2,987
12 3,312 3,102 2,266 2,717 3,918 2,263 3,350 3,312 4,136 2,970 2,717 3,918 2,137 3,558
13 3,5g8 3,384 2,472 2,964 4,245 2,580 3,955 3,588 4,512 3,240 2,964 4,245 2,450 4,181
14 3,864 3,666 2,678 3,211 4,571 2,911 4,612 3,864 4,888 3,510 3,211 4,571 2,776 4,855
15 4,140 3,948 2,884 3,458 4,898 3,254 5,322 4,140 5,264 3,780 3,458 4,898 3,114 5,582
tt1 16 4,416 4,230 3,090 3,705 5,224 3,608 6,084 4,416 5,640 4,050 3,705 5,224 3,464 6,362
~17 4,692 4,512 3,296 3,952 5,551 3,972 6,900 4,692 6,016 4,320 3,952 5,551 3,825 7,195
~ 18 4,968 4,794 3,~02 4,199 5,877 4,347 7,769 4,968 6,392 4,590 4,199 5,877 4,196 8,082
19 5,244 5,076 3,708 4,446 6,204 4,731 8,693 5,244 6,768 4,860 4,446 6,204 4,576 9,023
20 5,520 5,358 3,914 4,693 6,530 5,123 9,671 5,520 7,144 .5,130 4,693 6,530 4,966 10,019
21 5,796 5,640 4,120 4,940 6,857 5,524 10,705 5,796 7,520 5,400 4,940 6,857 5,364 11,070
22 6,072 5,922 4,326 5,187 7,183 5,933 11,793 6,072 7,896 5,670 5,187 7,183 5,770 12,176
23 6,348 6,204 4,532 5,434 7,510 6,349 12,938 6,348 8,272 5,940 5,434 7,510 6,184 13,338
24 6,624 6,486 4,738 5,681 7,836 6,772 14,140 6,624 8,648 6,210 5,681 7,836 6,604 14,557
25 6,900 6,768 4,944 5,928 8,163 7,201 15,398 6,900 9,024 6,480 5,928 8,163 7,032 15,833
26 7,176 7,050 5,150 6,175 8,489 7,637 16,714 7,176 9,400 6,750 6,175 8,489 7,466 17,166
27 7,176 7,332 5,356 6,422 8,816 8,079 18,087 7,176 9,776 7,020 6,422 8,816 7,906 18,557
28 7,176 7,614 5,356 6,422 9,142 8,526 19,520 7,176 10,152 7,020 6,422 9,142 8,351 20,007
29 7,176 7,896 5,356 6,422 9,469 8,979 21,011 7,176 10,528 7,020 6,422 9,469 8,802 21,516
30 7,176 8,178 5,356 6,422 9,795 9,437 22,562 7,176 ·10,904 7,020 6,422 9,795 9,259 23,084
31 7,176 8,460 5,356 6,422 10,122 9,900 . 24,173 7,176 11,280 7,020 6,422 10,122 9,720 24,713
• These rcsults were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$14.89) and family non-labor income (1=$2,867) from the sample of 11,739 husbands with working wives.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year. Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. H~lf = Half of lost wages.
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State. Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates
for Married Men with a Non-working Spouse-
Weeks Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear
i 276
°
0 0 347 83 86 276 0
° °
347 1,181 98
2 552 282 206 247 693 17 26 552 396 270 247 693 785 197
3 828 564 412 494 1,040
°
1 828 792 540 494 1,040 485 330
4 1,104 846 618 741 1,386 27 11 1,104 1,188 810 741 1,386 266 499
5 1,380 1,128 824 988 1,733 93 56 1,380 1,584 1,080 988 1,733 118 702
6 '1,656 1,410 1,030 1,235 2,079 194 136 1,656 1,980 1,350 1,235 2,079 32 941
7 1,932 1,692 1,236 1,482 2,426 327, 253 1,932 2,376 1,620 1,482 2,426
°
1,217
8 2,208 1,974 1,442 1,729 2,772 489 407 2,208 2,772 1,890 1,729 2,772 17 1,529
9 2,484 2,256 1,648 1,976 3,119 679 597 2,484 3,168 2,160 1,976 3,119 77 1,878
10 2,760 2,538 1,854 2,223 3,465 893 825 2,760 3,564 2,430 2,223 3,465 175 2,264
11 3,036 2,820 2,060 2,470 3,812 1,129 1,091 3,036 3,960 2,700 2,470 3,812 308 2,689
12 3,312 3,102 2,266 2,717 4,158 1,386 1,395 3,312 4,356 2,970 2,717 4,158 473 3,152
13 3,588 3,384 2,472 2,964 4,505 1,663 1,739 3,588 4,752 3,240 2,964 4,505 666 3,654
14 3,864 3,666 2,678 3,211 4,851 1,957 2,122 3,864 5,148 3,510 3,211 4,851 '885 4,195
tr1 15 4,140 3,948 2,884 3,458 5,198 2,268 2,544 4,140 5,544 3,780 3,458 5,198 1,128 4,776
tr1 16' 4,416 4,230 3,090 3,705 5,544 2,594 3,007 4,416 5,940 4,050 3,705 5,544 1,392 5,398I
Vl 17 4,692 4,512 3,296 3,952 5,891 2,935 3,512 4,692 6,336 4,320 3,952 5,891 1,677 6,0610'\
18 4,968 4,794 3,502 4,199 6,237 3,290 4,057 4,968 6,732 4,590 4,199 6,237 1,980 6,765
19 5,244 5,076 3,708 4,446 6,584 3,657 4,645 5,244 7,128 4,860 4,446 6,584 2,300 7,511
20 5,520 5,358. 3,914 4,693 6,930 4,036 5,276 5,520 7,524 5,130 4,693 6,930 2,636 8,301
21 5,796 5,640 4,120 4,940 7,277 4,426 5,950 5,796 7,920 5,400 4,940 7,277 2,987 9,133
22 6,072 5,922 4,326 5,187 7,623 4,826 6,668 6,072 8,316 5,670 5,187 7,623 3,352 10,009
23 6,348 6,204 4,532 5,434 7,970 5,237 7,430 6,348 8,?12 5,940 5,434 7,970 3,730 10,931
24 6,624 6,486 4,738 5,681 8,316 5,656 8,238 6,624 9,108 6,210 5,681 8,316 4,120 11,897
25 6,900 6;768 4,944 5,928 8,663 6,085 9,092 6,900 9,504 6,480 5,928 8,663 4,521 12,909
26 7,176 7,050 5,150 6,175 9,009 6,522 9,992 7,176 9,900 6,750 6,175 9,009 4,932 13,968
27 7,176 7,332 5,356 6,422 9,356 6,967 10,940 7,t76 10,296 7,020 6,422 9,356 5,354 15,074
28 7,176 7,614 5,356 6,422 9,702 7,420 11,936 7,176 10,692 7,020 6,422 9,702 5,785 16,229
29 7,176 7,896 5,356 6,422 10,049 7,880 12,980 7,176 11,088 7,020 6,422 10,049 6,225 17,432
30 7,176 8,178 5,356 6,422 10,395 8,346 14,075 7,176 11,484 7,020 6,422 10,395 6,673 18,685
. 31 7,176 8,460 5,356 6,422 10,742 8,819 15,219 7,176. '11,880 7,020 6,422 10,742 7,129 19,988
ft These re!\ults were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$16.47) and family non-labor income (1=$6,361) from the sample of 6,153 husbands with non-working wives.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year. Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly ~age State. Half = Half of lost wages.
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. Stone-Geary = Full c~mpensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function,
I1linois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State. Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 14
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars
. for Married Women with a Non-working Spouse'
Weeks Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone--Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone--Geary Linear
1 182 0 0 0 174 108 62 193 0 0 0 173 347 1
2 364 173 170 198 347 188 138 386 223 222 198 347 468 8
3 546 346 340 396 521 286 245 579 446 444 396 521 602 45
4 728 519 510 594 694 400 383 772 669 666 594 694 748 113
5 910 692 680 792 868 528 551 965 892 888 792 868 904 212
6 1,092 865 . 850 990 1041 669 750 1,158 . 1,115 1,110 990 1,041 1,070 342
7 1,274 1,038 1,020 1,188 1,215 820 981 1,351 1,338 1,332 1,188 1,215 1,245 503
8 1,456 1,211 1,190 1,386 1,388 982 1,243 1,544 1,561 J .554 1,386 1,388 1,428 695
9 1,638 1,384 1,360 1,584 1,562 1,154 1,536 1,737 1,784 \5116 1,584 1,562 1,618 919
10 1,820 1,557 1,530 1,782 1,735 1,334 1,861 1,930 2,007 1,998 1,782 1,735 1,815 1,174
11 2,OP2 1,730 1,700 1,980 1,909 1,521 2,218 2,123 2,230 2,220 1,980 1,909 2,018 1,461
12 2,184 1,903 1,870 2,178 2,082 1,716 2,607 2,316 2,453 2,442. 2,178 2,082 2,227 1,780
13 2,366 2,076 2,040 2,376 2,256 1,917 3,028 2,509 2,676 2,664 2,37( 2,256 2,442 2,132
14 2,548 2,249 2,210 2,574 2,429 2,124 3,481 2,702 2,899 2,886 2,574 2,429 2,661 2,516
tr1 15 2,730 2',422 2,380 2,772 2,603 2,338 3,967 2,895 3,122 3,108 2,772 2,603 2,886 2,932
tr1 16 2,912 2,595 2,550 2,970 2,776 2,559 4,486 3,088 3,345 3,330 2,970 2,776 3,115 3,381
I
VI 17 3,094 2,768 2,720 3,168 2,950 2,779 5,037 3,281 3,568 3,552 3,168 2,950 3,348 3,863~
18 3,276 2,941 2,890 3,366 3,123 3,007 5,622 3,474 3,791 3,774 3,366 3,123 3,585 4,378
19 3,458 3,114 3,060 3,564 3,297 3,239 6,240 3,667 4,014 3,996 3,564 . 3,297 3,826 4,926
20 3,640 3,287 3,230 3,762 3,470 3,475 6,891 3,860 4,237 4,218 3,762 3,470 4,070 5,508
21 3,822 3,460 3,400 3,960 3,644 3,715 7,576 4,053 4,460 4,440 3,960 3,644 4,317 6,124
22 4,004 3,633 3,570 4,158 3,817 3,959 8,295 4,246 4,683 4,662 4,158 3,817 4,568 6,773
23 4,186 3,806 3,740 4,356 3,991 4,206 9,048 4,439 4,906 4,884 4,356 3,991 4,821 7,456
24 4,368 3,979 3,910 4,554 4,164 4,456 9,835 4,632 5,129 5,106 4,554 4,164 5,078 8,174
25 4,550 4,152 4,080 4,752 4,338 4,709 10,657 4,825 5,352 5,328 4,752 4,338 5,337 8,926
26 4,732 4,325 4,250 4',950 4,511 4,965 11,513 5,018 5,575 5,550 4,950 4,511 5,598 9,713
27 4,732 4,498 4,420 5,148 4,685 5,224 12,404 5,01.8 5,798 5,772 5,148 4,685 5,862 10,534
28 4,732 4,671 4,420 5,148 4,858 5,485 13,330 5,018 6,021 5,772 5,148 4,858 6,128 11,391
29 4,732 4,844 4,420 5,148 5,032 5,749 14,292 5,018 6,244 5,772 5,148 5,032 6,397 12,283
30 4,732 5,017 4,420 5,148 5,205 6,015 15,289 5,018 6,467 5,772 5,148 5,205 6,667 13,210
31 4,732 5,190 4,420 5,148 5,379 6,284 16,322 5,018 6,690 5,772 5,148 5,379 6,940 14,174
• Thcsc results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$10.50) and family non-labor income (1=$10,297) from the sample of 2,505 wives with non-working husbands.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year. Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. Half = Half of lost wages.
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. Stone--Geary = Full c<?mpensation at the means given the Stone--Geary Utility Function.
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State. Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars
for Single Men-
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Weeks Michigan Massachusetts Illinois O,regon Half Stone--Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone--Geary Linear
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
rn 15
~ 16
00 17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
'273
546
819
1,092
, 1,365
1,638
1,911
2,184
2,457
2,730
3,003
3,276
3,549
3,822
4,095
4,368
4,641
4,914
5,187
5,460
5,733
6,006
6,279
6,552
6,825
7,098
7,098
7,098,
7,098
7,098
7,098
o
273
546
819
1,092
1,365
1,638
1,911
2,184
2,457
2,730
3,003
3,276
3,549
3,822
4,095
4,368
4,641
4,914
5,187
5,460
5,733
6,006
6,279
6,552
6,825
.7,098
7,371
7,644
7,917
8,190
o
206
412
618
824
1,030
1,236
1,442
1,648
1,854
2,060
2,266
2,472
2,678
2,884
3,090
3,296
, 3,502
3,708
3,914
4,120
4,326
4,532
4,738
4,944
5,150
5,356
5,356
5,356
5,356
5,356
o
247
494
741
988
1,235
1,482
1,729
1,976
2,223
2,470
2,717
2,964
3,211
3,458
3,705
3,952
4,199
4,446
4,693
4,940
5,187
5,434
5,681
5,928
6,175
6,422
6,422
6,422
6,422
6,422
274
547
821
1,094
1,368
1,641
1,915
2,188
2,462
2,735
3,009
3,282
3,556
3,829
4,103
4,376
4,650
4,923
5,197
5,470
5,744
6,017
6,291
6,564
6,838
7,111
7,385
7,658
7,932
8,205
8,479
38
107
205
330
480
650
841
1,049
1,274
1,514
1,767
2,034
2,312
2,601
2,900
3,209
3,527
3,853
4,187
4,529
4,877
5,232
5,593
5,960
6,333
6,711
7,093
7,481
7,873
8,269
8,670
14
70
167
307 .
489
714
982
,1,293
1,649
2,048
2,491
2,979
3,511
4,089
4,712
5,382
6,097
6,858
7,666
8,522
9,425
10,375
11,374
12,421
13,517
14,662
15,857
17,102
18,397
19,742
21,139
276
552
828
1,104
1,380
1,656
1,932
2,208
2,484
2,760
3,036
3,312
3,588
3,864
4,140
4,416
4,692
4,968
5,244
5,520
5,796
6,072
6,348
6,624
6,900
7,176
7,176
7,176
7,176
7,176
7,176
o
323
646
969
1,292
1,615
1,938
2,261
2,584
2,907
3,230
3,553
3,876
4,199
4,522
4,845
5,168
5,491
5,814
6,137
6,460
6,783
7,106
7,429
7,752
8,075
8,398
8,721
9,044
9,367
9,690
o
270
540
810
1,080
1,350
1,620
1,890
2,160
2,430
2,700
2,970
3,240
3,510
3,780
4,050
4,320
4,590
4,860
5,130
5,400
5,670
5,940
6,210
6,480
6,750
7,020
7,020
.7,020
7,020
7,020
o
247
494
741
988
1,235
1,482
1,729
1,976
2,223
2,470
2,717
2,964
3,211
3,458
3,705
3,952
4,199
4,446
4,693
4,940
5,187
5,434
5,681
5,928
6,175
6,422
6,422
6,422
6,422
6,422
274
547
821
1,094
1,368
1,641
1,915
2,188
2,462
2,735
3,009
3,282
3,556
3,829
4~103
4,376
4,650
4,923
5,197
5,470
5,744
6,017
6,291
6,564
6,838
7,111
7,385
7,658
7,932
8,205
8,479
8
3
38
107
206
333
484
657
849
1,060
1,287
1,529
1,786
2,055
2,335
2,627
2,929
3,241
3,561
3,890
4,227
4,571
4,922
5,279
5,643
6,012
6,387
6,768
7,153
7,543
7,937
170
310
491
715
982
1,291
1,643
2,039
2,478
2,961
3,489
4,061
4,678
5,340
6,047
6,801
7,600
8,446
9,338
10,278
11,265
12,300
13,383
14,514
15,694
16,924
18,203
19,531
20,911
22,341
23,822
ft These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$13.24) and family non-labor income (1=$1,862) from the sample of 6,031 single males.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State.
Massach~setts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State.
Illinois = Compensation payable in Illinois, a Multi-quarter State.
Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Half = Half of lost wages.
Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone--Geary Utility Function.
Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Iable 16
Unemployment Compensation Simulation Estimates in Dollars
for Single Women-
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Weeks Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear Michigan Massachusetts Illinois Oregon Half Stone-Geary Linear
1 219 0 0 0 210 51 15 230 0 0 0 210 132 1
2 438 210 206 247 420 99 67 460 260 269 247 420 202 6
3 657 420 412 494 630 163 128 690 520 538 494 630 285 31
4 876 630 618 741 840 240 210 920 780 807 741 840 381 76
5 1,095 840 824 988 1,050 330 311 1,150 1,040 1,076 988 1,050 488 141
6 1,314 1,050 1,030 1,235 1,260 432 433 1,380 1,300 1,345 1,235 1,260 605 227
7 1,533 1,260 1,236 1,482 1,470 545 576 1,610 1,560 1,614 1,482 1,470 733 334
8 1,752 1,470 1,442 1,729 1,680 669 740' 1,840 1,820 1,883 1,729 1,680 870 461
'9 1,971 1,680 1,648 1,976 1,890 802 925 2,070 2,080 2,152 1,976 1,890 1,016 610
10 2,190 1,890 1,854 2,223 2,100 945 1,131 2,300 2,340 2,421 2,223 2,100 1,171 779
11 2,409 2,100 2,060 2,470 2,310 1,096 1,359 2,530 2,600 2,690 2,470 2,310 1,334 971
12 2,628 2,310 2,266 2,717 2,520 1,156 1,608 2,760 2,860 2,959 2,717 . 2,520 1,504 1,184
13 2,847 2,520 2,472 2,964 2,730 1,424 1,879' 2,990 3,120 3,228 2,964 2,730 1,681 1,419
14 3,066 2,730 2,678 3,211 2,940 1,600 2,173 3,220 3,380 3,497 3,211 2,940 1,866 1,676
trl 15 3,285 2,940 2,884 3,458 3,150 1,782 2,489 3,450 3,640 3,766 3,458 3,150 2,057 1,956
tr1 16 3,,504 3,150 3,090 3,705 3,360 1,971 2,828 3,680 3,900 4,035 3,705 3,360 2,254 2,259•VI 17 3,723 3,360 3,296 3,952 3,570 2,166 3,190 3,910 4,160 4,304 3,952 3,570 2,457 2,584\0
18 3,942 3,570 3,502 4,199 3,780 2,368 3,575 4,140 4A20 4,573 4,199 3,780 2,665 2,933
19 4,161 3,780 3,708 4,446 3,990 2,575 3,983 4,370 4,680 4,842 4,446 3,990 2,879 3,305
20 4,380 3:990 3,914 4,693 4,200 2,788 4,415 ·4,600 4,940 5,111 4,693 4,200 3,098 3,701
21 4,599 4,200 4,120 4,940 4,410 3,006 4,871 4,830 5,200 5,380 4,940 4,410 3,322 4,121
'22 4,818 ' 4,410 4,326 5,187 4,620 3,230 5,352 5,060 5,460 5,649 5,187 4,620 3,551 4,565
23 5,037 4,620 4,532 5,434 4,830 3,458 5,857 5,290 5,720 5,918 5,434 4,830 3,784 5,034
24 5,256 4,830 4,738 5,681 5,040 3,690 6,387 5,520 5,980 6,187 5,681 5,040 4,022 5,527
25 5,475 5,040 4,944 5,928 5,250 3,927 6,942 5,750 6,240 6,456 5,928 5,150 4,264 6,046
26 5,694 5,250 5,150 6,175 5,460 4,169 7,523 5,980 6,500 6,725 6,175 5,460 4,509 6,591
27 5,694 5,460 5,356 6,422 5,670 4,414 8,129 5,980 6,760 6,994 6,422 5,670 4,759 7,161
28 5,694 5,670 5,356 6,422 5,880 4,663 8,762 ' 5,980 7,020 ,6,994 6,422 5,880 5,012 7,757
29 5,694 5,880 5,356 6,422 6,090 4,917 9,421 5,980 7,280 6,994 6,422 6,090 5,269 8,380
30 5,694 6,090 5,356 6,422 6,300 5,173 10,107 5,980 7,540 6,994 6,422 6,300 5,529 9,029
31 5,694 6,300 5,356 6,422 6,510 5,433 10,820 5,980 7,800 6,994 6,422 6,510 5,793 9,706
• These results were computed using mean values of the hourly wage rate (w=$10.51) and family non-labor income (I =$2,394) from the sample of 7,026 single females.
Weeks = Number of weeks unemployed in the year. Oregon = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage State.
Michigan = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage State. Half = Half of lost wages.
Massachusetts = Compensation payable in Massachusetts a High-quarter State. Stone-Geary = Full compensation at the means given the Stone-Geary Utility Function.
lllinois = Compensation payable in lllinois, a Multi-quarter State. Linear = Full compensation at the means given the Linear Labor Supply Function.
Table 17
Proportion of Sub-sample with One.:.half Earnings Replaced
when the Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) is Set at
Various Fractions of·the Full-sample Average Weekly Wage
(AWW=$519)
Married Both Married One Working Single·
Fraction
Working
ofAWW Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Males Females Total
0.50 0.41 0.76 0.44 0.80 0.57 0.72 0.60
0.55 0.47 0.81 0.49 0.84 0.63 . 0.77 0.65
0.60 0.55 0.86 0.55 0.88 0.69 0.82 0.71
0.67 0.64 0.90 0.61 0.91 0.77 0.87 0.77
0.70 0.66 0.91 0~63 0.91 0.78 0.88 0.79
0.75 0.73 0.93 0.68 0.94 0.83 0.91 0.83
AWW 653 378 693 347 547 420 519
(std. dev.) (396) (274) (538) (301) (802) (287) (470)
Sample Size 11,739 11,739 6,153 2,505 6,031 7,026 45,193
Table 18
Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) Required for
Each Sub-sample to Yield One-halffor Four-Fifths
Married Both Working Married One Working
Husbands
442
Wives
279
Husbands
500
Wives
260
EE-60
Males
375
Single
Females
302
Total
375
